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IndigoZebra, also known as Speccom, is a threat group associated with targeted intrusions against government ministries in Central Asia, with activity documented in 2021. Its initial-access techniques include spearphishing emails carrying malicious attachments, including password-protected RAR archives. Social-engineering messages encourage recipients to review purported file modifications, inducing them to open malicious content and trigger execution. The group establishes operational infrastructure using domains that resemble official government domains. It downloads additional files and tools from command-and-control servers and has acquired publicly available tools including NBTscan and Meterpreter. Its tradecraft combines government impersonation, attachment-based delivery, user-assisted execution, and follow-on tool deployment.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
5 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A China-nexus-associated activity cluster previously documented targeting Central Asian ministries using similarly patterned impersonation domains and naming conventions.
Referenced as suspected China-nexus activity with infrastructure naming similarities to SilkParasite-linked systems; the content states this is an investigative lead rather than proof of a direct operational relationship.
A suspected China-nexus activity cluster mentioned because its previously attributed infrastructure has naming similarities to the SilkParasite-linked infrastructure. The article cautions that this is an investigative lead rather than evidence of a direct operational relationship.
Mentioned as contextual comparison based on similar Central Asian targeting and domain-naming patterns. The content does not establish that IndigoZebra operates the analyzed infrastructure.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.