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UNC1860, also known as ShroudedSnooper, Scarred Manticore, and Storm-0861, is an Iranian state-sponsored threat actor assessed to be affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The group has operated since at least 2020 and is notable for persistent, stealth-focused intrusions against high-priority networks in the Middle East, especially telecommunications and government organizations. UNC1860 is widely assessed to function as a state-sponsored initial access group within the Iranian cyber ecosystem, establishing footholds and long-term persistence that can be leveraged by other MOIS-affiliated operators, including overlaps reported with APT34/OilRig. UNC1860 commonly gains access by exploiting vulnerable internet-facing systems, including SharePoint vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-0604, and then deploying web shells, droppers, and passive backdoors. Reported tooling associated with the actor includes controllers such as TEMPLEPLAY and VIROGREEN; web shells and droppers such as STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY; loaders and implants such as OATBOAT, TEMPLEDOOR, FACEFACE, SPARKLOAD, TOFUDRV, TOFULOAD, WINTAPIX, and TEMPLEDROP; and defense-evasion tooling such as TEMPLELOCK. A defining feature of the group’s tradecraft is its use of passive implants that avoid initiating outbound command-and-control traffic, instead listening for inbound tasking, which reduces network-detection opportunities and supports stealthy persistence. The actor has demonstrated strong post-compromise capability, including remote command execution, file transfer, proxying, and facilitating access to otherwise unreachable internal systems. Its tooling has been used to support scanning, credential validation, exploitation of additional regional targets, and possible assistance with lateral movement. UNC1860 has also shown advanced defense-evasion and persistence tradecraft, including use of kernel-driver-based techniques, repurposing a legitimate Iranian antivirus file-system filter driver for protection of deployed malware, and interfering with Windows Event Log service threads. The group has been observed using compromised environments as staging infrastructure to scan and target other entities in the region. Victimology consistently centers on Middle Eastern government and telecommunications networks, with confirmed activity affecting Israel and broader regional targeting that includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iraq. UNC1860-linked tooling has also been associated with access preparation in incidents that later involved disruptive or wiper activity, although the actor is primarily assessed as the access-enablement and persistence component rather than the destructive operator itself. Its dominant mission is espionage-oriented access development and support for broader Iranian state cyber operations.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
22 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
30 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
25 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
135 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Stealth-focused long-term access operations in telecom and government networks using passive backdoors, web shells, and a repurposed kernel driver to maintain low-visibility persistence.
State-sponsored initial access group associated with Iran that gains footholds in victim networks, deploys webshells and passive implants, and transfers access to other Iranian threat groups for espionage, ransomware, or disruptive operations.
MOIS-attributed Iranian threat actor focused on intelligence collection and initial access operations, including telecom and government intrusions in the Middle East.
Iran-linked access broker providing initial access/footholds in high-value networks (especially telecommunications) and handing that access to other Iranian state hacking groups; uses a large set of custom passive implants/backdoors and inbound-only C2-like interaction to reduce detection.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.