Loading threat actor…
TeamTNT is a financially motivated cybercriminal group conducting cryptojacking, credential theft, and botnet operations against cloud instances and containerized environments. Its documented activity dates to February 2020 and includes compromises of Redis servers, Docker environments, Kubernetes clusters, and AWS resources. The group exploits exposed or misconfigured services, including Docker APIs and Kubernetes kubelets, and scans internet-facing infrastructure and internal networks to identify additional targets. TeamTNT relies heavily on Bash scripts and open-source tools. It deploys XMRig and related miners to hijack computing resources for cryptocurrency mining, including Monero, and uses the Tsunami botnet malware for remote command execution and DDoS attacks. It has abused Weave Scope as a backdoor for monitoring container infrastructure and executing shell commands. Credential collection includes SSH private keys, cloud credentials, and application secrets, using tools such as Punk, Mimipy, Mimipenguin, and LaZagne. Harvested SSH credentials and discovered host information support lateral movement. Persistence mechanisms include creating privileged local accounts, adding attacker-controlled SSH authorized keys, and installing cryptocurrency miners as services. Defense-evasion techniques include AES-encrypted binaries, runtime encryption with ezuri, binary packing, script obfuscation, encoded communications, the Diamorphine kernel rootkit, and process-hiding tools such as libprocesshider. The Chimaera campaign, launched in July 2021, continued attacks against Docker, Kubernetes, and Weave Scope deployments while expanding credential theft and cloud reconnaissance. It used more than 70 distinct AWS CLI commands to enumerate identity configuration, compute instances, storage, logging, and other cloud resources.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
46 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
41 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The report lists “Docker Escape Tool (CVE-2019-5736)” among the tools and exploits TeamTNT employed to conduct its activities.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
613 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as an ATT&CK-associated group for this detection technique; no activity by the group is described in the content.
Referenced only as an annotated actor associated with the detection technique.
Listed in the detection annotation metadata.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.